

Eli Eilon

Subjectivity and World Interpretation in Nietzsche

Nietzsche's contention that there exists naught but interpretations is both a warning and a restriction. If the world consists of interpretations, then there is no world in itself or any interpreter in himself or herself. Any attempt to explore the object of interpretation itself (the world) or of the interpreting subject in himself is metaphysically erroneous or at best a mere abstraction.

Yet Nietzsche has his own abstractions: he addresses the objective pole (the world, that which is interpreted) when he qualifies it (as chaotic, indifferent, etc.); and also formulates determinations concerning the subjective pole – the interpreter- for instance that the interpreter through his or her own perspective comprises – beyond his or her personality – broad human and natural dimensions. It would thus seem that Nietzsche approaches the interpretation of the world from a viewpoint that totally *denies* the objective and subjective poles of the interpretation, but also from an abstract standpoint which rather *highlights* these poles.

Therefore, when we raise the question - what is world interpretation in Nietzsche - we may evade neither of the two levels, the metaphysical or the abstract one. More specifically I argue that (a) both the metaphysical and the abstract levels are crucial to an understanding of "world interpretation" *à la* Nietzsche; (b) that the two levels are in constant conflict with regard to the subjective pole; and therefore (c) the attempts of several scholars to present Nietzsche's world interpretation as unambiguous and harmonious notwithstanding, an unresolved tension between the two levels is *built into* this conception of Nietzsche's. Yet (d) this inherent tension must be preserved if any sense is to be made of Nietzsche's ethical-aesthetic assertions in the context of his conception of man as interpreter and artistic creator.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,

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